INTRODUCTION
This paper studies whether the credibility of a disclosure is a determinant of the market underreaction to the news conveyed by the disclosure. Since Ball and Brown (1968) , several papers have documented a market underreaction to news such as earnings announcements (Fama 1998) . We hypothesize that news credibility can provide an explanation for underreaction to news. To test this hypothesis, we focus on management forecast news because prior research has highlighted that the voluntary and non-audited nature of management forecasts leads to concerns about the credibility of these forecasts (e.g., Jennings 1987; Skinner 1994; Hutton, Miller, and Skinner 2003; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Hutton and Stocken 2009) . Thus, management forecasts provide a powerful setting to explore the role of credibility in explaining the underreaction to news.
Our study relies on the idea that investors' reaction to forecast news is a function of the new information about future cash flows and the credibility of the forecast (Jennings 1987 ). Thus we argue that investors are more likely to delay their reaction to less credible news until more credible information (e.g., announcement of actual earnings) appear to support the forecast. If that is the case, then we expect that when credibility of the news is higher, there will be a stronger market reaction at the time of the forecast, which is then followed by a smaller post-management forecast drift in returns.
Using a sample of management forecasts from 1996 to 2008, we first document an underreaction to management forecast news. This is an important necessary condition for us to be able to test the role of credibility on the market underreaction to forecast news. Using portfolio analyses, we document significant 3-month abnormal buy-hold returns of 3.65% (-0.95%) in the extreme good (bad) forecast news quintile. A hedge portfolio that is long (short) in the extreme good (bad) news quintiles results in abnormal returns of 4.60% in the next three months; these returns are both statistically and economically significant.
We then test whether forecast credibility provides an explanation for the market underreaction to forecast news. Specifically, we examine how the reaction to the forecast and the subsequent return correction vary cross-sectionally with various proxies of credibility: prior forecasting accuracy, litigation risk, proprietary costs (proxied by R&D intensity and industry concentration), the extent to which analysts agree with the management forecast, and bad news versus good news. With regards to prior forecasting accuracy, we follow the literature and assume that managers develop a reputation for issuing credible forecasts when prior forecasts have proven to be more accurate (Williams 1996; Hirst, Koonce, and Miller 1999) . We treat forecasts of firms that are exposed to greater litigation risk and greater proprietary costs (i.e., more competition and higher R&D) as being more credible (Gigler 1994; Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson 1995; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Wang 2007 ). Analyst agreement is determined by whether the post-management-forecast analyst consensus forecast is close to the management forecast. Finally, we assume, based on the findings in the prior literature (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005; Hutton et al. 2003 ) that bad news forecasts are more credible than good news forecasts.
We perform two sets of tests to examine whether credibility is associated with underreaction to news. The first set of tests relies on the three-day abnormal returns around the management forecast. We provide some evidence that the market relies on the credibility of the management forecasts when reacting to management forecast news in the short-term. In particular, we show that the market reaction to forecast news is larger for more credible forecasts, with credibility proxied by prior management forecast accuracy, R&D, analyst agreement, and bad as opposed to good management forecast news. Overall these findings are consistent with prior research that documents a lower market response to forecasts with lower credibility.
The second set of tests, and the key innovation of our paper, examines whether the abnormal returns subsequent the management forecasts vary cross-sectionally with forecast credibility. Consistent with this hypothesis, the post-management-forecast 3-month hedge abnormal returns is smaller for more credible forecasts, with credibility proxied by prior management forecast accuracy, litigation risk, competition, R&D, and bad (as opposed to good) management forecast news. For example, using prior forecast accuracy (R&D) as a proxy for credibility, our regression results show that the 3-month hedge abnormal returns are 3.01% (3.96%) lower for more credible forecasts. The results, however, are statistically insignificant when credibility is proxied by analyst agreement.
Overall, the evidence from both sets of tests suggests that for more credible forecasts, the market reacts more strongly in the short-term and that the subsequent drift is smaller. Further, our findings also imply that the market overly discounts less credible forecasts, resulting in a greater underreaction and a subsequent correction. This is because, if the market's discount of the news based on the perception of credibility was appropriate, there would be no basis for a drift.
We then provide a series of tests to ensure that our results are not simply capturing factors related to the post-earnings announcement drift phenomenon. First, in our main tests, we control for prior drift in returns (momentum), earnings surprises (PEAD) and analyst forecast revisions. Second, we show that credibility continues to explain the cross-sectional variation in the underreaction to management forecast news after controlling for earnings persistence, size, investor sophistication, and transaction costs, which have been shown in the prior literature to be cross-sectional determinants of the post-earnings-announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990; Bartov et al. 2000; Ng, Rusticus, and Verdi 2008) . We also control for management underreaction to news, a phenomenon documented by Gong, Li, and Wang (2011) . Finally, we show that the post-management-forecast drift is a distinct phenomenon from the post-earningsannouncement drift. We sort the observations into earnings surprise and management forecast surprise portfolios and show that the underreaction to management forecast surprise is present among firms with positive, negative or zero earnings surprise.
Our paper extends the management forecast literature by showing that credibility affects not only the short-window returns around management forecasts (e.g., Hutton et al. 2003; Rogers and Stocken 2005) , but also the long-window returns subsequent to the forecasts. Specifically, we show that, in addition to the smaller reaction to less credible forecasts in the short-term, there is also an underreaction with a subsequent correction in the long-term that varies with the forecast credibility. In doing so, we also contribute to the literature on market underreaction to news by showing that the credibility of the news signal is an important factor driving the cross-sectional variation in the market underreaction to news.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data and variable measurement. Section 4 presents the results, whereas Section 5 describes our additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Market underreaction to management forecasts
The main objective of this paper is to investigate whether credibility of news is a cross-sectional determinant of the market under-reaction to news. We test this hypothesis using management forecasts (as opposed to PEAD) because management forecasts are voluntary disclosures about which investors have significant credibility concerns. Thus management forecasts provide us with a powerful setting to explore capital market consequences of cross-sectional variation in credibility in disclosure.
A necessary condition to explore the role of credibility in the underreaction to management forecast news is to examine whether an underreaction exists in the first place. There is extensive evidence that investors underreact to earnings news, a phenomenon known as the post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) (e.g., Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990) . Specifically, prior research documents a positive (negative) drift in post-earnings-announcement abnormal returns after positive (negative) earnings news.
The typical explanation for this drift is that investors underreact to earnings news at the time of the earnings announcement and that a drift in returns occurs due to a subsequent market correction in the longer term. An examination into whether there is a postmanagement-forecast drift is a natural extension of the PEAD literature.
The management forecast literature provides some indirect evidence of a drift in returns after forecast news. Using a sample of 548 forecasts from 1979 -1983 , McNichols (1989 Figure 2 ) documents a negative drift in returns for negative forecast news, but no drift in returns after positive forecast news. In contrast, Anilowski et al. (2007, Figure 5) document a positive drift in returns after positive aggregate forecast news quarters but no drift after negative news quarters.
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None of these papers, however, provide conclusive evidence as to whether there is an underreaction to forecast news. Hence, as a preliminary step to investigating the role of credibility to the underreaction, we will first establish the existence of the underreaction within our sample. reaction to the news in the forecasts, however, is expected be a function of the new information about future cash flows and the credibility of the forecast (Jennings 1987) , where credibility refers to the extent to which investors perceive the forecast to be believable. The concern about credibility arises because management forecasts are voluntary and unaudited disclosures over which managers have substantial discretion.
Early research even questions whether credibility concerns related to management forecasts would render the forecasts uninformative to investors (Patell 1976; Penman 1980) . Since then, the literature has established that investors do react to management forecasts. Nevertheless, the concern about credibility remains. For example, Healy and Palepu (2001, 425) emphasize that "the extent to which voluntary disclosure mitigates resource misallocation in the capital market depends on the degree of credibility of information on the firm's economics that is not available from other sources, including required disclosures. Because managers have incentives to make self-serving voluntary disclosures, it is unclear whether management disclosures are credible."
If there is an underreaction to forecast news, we conjecture that the underreaction is likely to be greater when there are greater credibility concerns. In particular, investors are more likely to disregard the forecast news when the news is less credible and delay their reaction until more credible information (e.g., actual earnings) is disclosed that supports the forecast. Specifically, we expect that when credibility of the news is higher, there will be a stronger market reaction at the time of the forecast, which is then followed by a smaller post-management forecast drift.
To illustrate, assume that prevailing expectations are 5 cents a share and management issues a forecast of 10 cents a share. In addition, to ease the illustration, assume that the forecast is unbiased (i.e., actual earnings are 10 cents a share).According to our conjecture, if the market considers the forecast credible, it will revise its expectation fully to management's estimate of 10 cents a share upon management forecast release, and there should be no post-forecast drift. However, if the market views the forecast as less than credible and, therefore, revises its expectation to only 7 cents a share, then there will be a delayed response when until the actual earnings of 10 cents are ultimately announced. The delayed response only happens because the market made the faulty assumption (based upon whatever information it used) that management's forecast was not credible. Therefore, for credibility to have a role in the post-management-forecast drift, it must be the case that while the market relies on credibility in responding to management forecasts, it overly discounts less credible forecasts when compared to their actual ability to predict actual earnings (i.e., 7 vs. 10 cents in the prior example). Prior literature suggests that this could be the case. For example, prior research has shown that the abnormal returns around management forecasts are larger for bad news forecasts than for good news forecasts (e.g., Jennings 1987; Hutton et al. 2003) . However, Rogers and Stocken (2005) find no difference in the management forecast bias (i.e., the difference between actual earnings and forecasted earnings) between bad news and good news forecasts. Thus, the lack of difference in bias between good and bad news forecasts seems consistent with an investor over-discounting good news surprises despite little difference in their actual forecasting ability.
To test our hypotheses, we examine the short-term and long-term reactions to forecast news as a function of forecast credibility. Our first hypothesis predicts that the short-term market reaction to the forecast news increases with the credibility of the forecast. Our second hypothesis focuses on whether the long-term market (under-)reaction to forecast news decreases with forecast credibility. We drop all forecasts without the CUSIP-PERMNO link that is required to link the forecasts to stock returns from CRSP. We also restrict forecasts to those of firms with ordinary shares listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ (i.e., CRSP share codes 10 and 11
and CRSP exchange codes 1, 2, and 3) on the forecast date.
Next, we retain all forecasts for which we can compute forecast news. Following prior research (e.g., Baginski et al. 1993; Clement et al. 2003; Cotter et al. 2006) we compute management forecast news, also known as forecast surprise, Surprise, as follows:
i) If the management EPS forecast is a point forecast (i.e., forecast description code is 'A', 'F', or 'Z'), then
If the management EPS forecast is a range forecast (i.e., forecast description code is 'B', 'G', or 'H'), then
where X is the value of the forecast for a point forecast, and Y and Z are the lower and upper bounds of the forecast, respectively, for a range forecast, and P is the stock price two days before the forecast date. Further, since the above computation involves per-share numbers and the management forecast and analyst forecast are made on different days, we ensure that both forecasts are based on the same number of outstanding shares by using the shares split factors from CRSP database to adjust EPS numbers (if necessary).
Next, we remove all forecasts for which we cannot compute our dependent variables -short-term and long-term abnormal returns -and our control variables -beta, size, book-to-market, momentum, prior quarterly earnings surprise and prior analyst forecast revision. Details of the above variables are provided below. Finally, we remove all forecasts made within three days of an earnings announcement. Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) show that forecasts bundled with earnings announcement releases are common, so we exclude them to mitigate concerns that our results are driven by the postearnings-announcement drift.
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We then sort firms into quintile portfolios based on the management forecast surprises. We use the distribution of all the forecast surprises in the previous year to determine the cut-offs for the quintile portfolios to avoid a look-ahead bias when determining the relative magnitude of forecast surprises (Foster et al. 1984) .
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This procedure imposes the deletion of all forecasts in 1995, the first year in the sample. Our final sample consists of 23,822 management forecasts from 1996 to 2008.
Measures of market reaction
To study the short-term market reaction to management forecast surprises, we measure the size-adjusted return in the 3-day window around the management forecast date, AbRet3d. To study the long-term market reaction, we measure the postmanagement-forecast size-adjusted return, AbRet3m and AbRet12m. AbRet3m
(AbRet12m) is the 3-month (12-month) size-adjusted returns beginning from the third day after the management forecast. The abnormal returns, which are in percentages, are computed as the buy-hold return of the stock minus the benchmark buy-hold return of the decile portfolio of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks of similar size as of the most 5 When we include in our sample management forecasts that are bundled with earnings announcement releases, we continue to find evidence that there is an underreaction to forecast news and that greater credibility mitigates this underreaction. 6 The results are robust when we use the current year's distribution as an alternative way to assign firms into portfolios.
recent June (i.e., the June before the management forecast date). The equal-weighted cutoff points for the size portfolios are obtained from Professor Kenneth French's website. From the investors' perspective, many factors could influence their evaluation of a forecast's credibility. In this paper, we rely on six credibility proxies to examine the role of credibility in market's reaction to forecast news. These measures follow from prior research, which uses forecast characteristics, firm characteristics, and market reaction to infer the credibility of a given forecast.
Our first measure of credibility is forecast accuracy. We expect managers to We compute Accuracy as the average of the accuracy of all management forecasts of EPS announced prior to the current management forecast. Our use of the earnings announced prior to the current forecast ensures that the accuracies of all the forecasts used to compute Accuracy are known and measurable at the time of the current forecast.
To compute Accuracy, we first retrieve the series of actual earnings before the current 7 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html forecast. We then retrieve all the management forecasts that the firm has issued in relation to the actual earnings. By construction, these forecasts are made prior to the current forecast. We compute accuracy for each of these forecasts as the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings and management forecast, scaled by share price two days before the forecast date and multiplied by minus one.
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Accuracy is then computed as the average of the forecast accuracies of all prior forecasts.
Our second measure of credibility is litigation risk. Managers of firms facing higher litigation risk are more likely to be more careful in issuing forecasts and are less likely to use earnings forecasts to opportunistically manipulate investors' expectations (Frankel et al. 1995; Rogers and Stocken 2005) . To the extent that litigation risk constrains opportunistic forecasting, it might increase investors' perception of a forecast's credibility. We measure LitRisk using the model in Rogers and Stocken (2005) -see Appendix 1 for details.
Our third and fourth measures of credibility use proprietary costs to proxy for credibility. Gigler (1994) highlights the tension between the benefit of providing investors with value-relevant voluntary information and the cost of revealing proprietary information to competitors and argues that higher cost reflects greater credibility. First, we expect proprietary cost to increase in the extent to which the firm faces competition within the industry because more competition increases the likelihood that competitors will use the disclosed information to their own advantage and to the firm's disadvantage, which is consistent with Gigler (1994).
We measure competition, Competition, as the negative of the Herfindahl Index, which is a measure of industry concentration. The formula for the Herfindahl index is 2 n i i s  , where s i is the market share of firm i in the market, and n is the number of firms.
The negative sign is added because a more competitive industry is a less concentrated industry. The Competition associated with each forecast is based on the competitiveness of the firm's industry in the prior calendar quarter.
In addition, we expect the proprietary cost of disclosing earnings forecasts to be higher when a firm engages in more research and development because these forecasts reveal to competitors the successes and failures of new projects undertaken by the firm (Wang 2007) . We measure the research and development intensity (R&D) of a firm using research and development expenses scaled by total assets. The R&D associated with each forecast is based on the research and development that firm engaged in during the prior fiscal year.
Our fifth measure of credibility is analyst agreement. We argue that the extent to which analysts agree with a management forecast is indicative of the analysts' perception of the credibility of the management forecast. To operationalize this measure, we construct an indicator variable, AnalystAgree, equalling one (i) if the management forecast is a point forecast and the post-management-forecast analyst consensus median forecast is within one penny of the management EPS forecast, or (ii) if the management forecast is a range forecast and the post-management-forecast analyst consensus median EPS forecast is within upper and lower bounds of the management forecast, and zero otherwise.
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Two caveats with this measure are in order: First, investors underreact to information provided by analysts (e.g., Givoly and Lakonishok, 1980; Gleason and Lee, 2003) . Second, analysts themselves do not fully impound the implications of the firm's disclosures in their forecasts (e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan, 2001 ).
Our final proxy for credibility is whether the forecast conveys good or bad news.
Prior literature has argued that there are managerial incentives to voluntarily disclose good news and withhold bad news, and thus good news forecasts are less credible than bad news forecasts (Hutton et al. 2003; Rogers and Stocken 2005) . Hence, in this paper, we also examine whether there is any difference in the market reaction to good and bad news forecasts. Hence, we develop two variables, Good News and Bad News:
News is a dummy variable equalling one if Surprise is positive, and zero otherwise, and (ii) Bad News is a dummy variable equalling one if Surprise is negative, and zero otherwise. We then compare the magnitude of the effects for good and bad news using forecasts of no news (about 10% of our sample) as the benchmark. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
Analyses of market reaction by quintile portfolios
As discussed in section 3.1, we assign firms into quintile portfolios based on the management forecast surprises, with quintile 1 (Q1) and quintile 5 (Q5) consisting of firms disclosing the most negative and most positive forecast surprises, respectively. 9 We use one penny as the boundary to determine the credibility of point forecasts because point forecasts are typically preceded by modifiers such as "about" or "approximately." In untabulated analysis we use zero or two pennies and find similar results. 10 In untabulated analysis we find that our measures of credibility are positively associated with current forecast accuracy suggesting that they carry information about actual earnings. The first column reports the means of the forecast surprises (Surprise), which increase, by construction, from Q1 to Q5. The 3-day abnormal returns (AbRet3d) is -10.90 (3.79) for Q1 (Q5). This is consistent with prior research that shows that the investors react to management forecasts by revising the stock price in the direction of the management forecast (e.g., Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Waymire 1984) .
Further, consistent with prior research (e.g., Hutton et al. 2003 ) the market reaction to bad news is larger than the reaction to good news.
The last two columns of Table 1 present the analysis of the long-term market reaction, in terms of post-management-forecast 3-month and 12-month abnormal returns (AbRet3m and AbRet12m, respectively). For the extreme good forecast news quintile, there is a positive 3-month (12-month) abnormal returns of 3.65% (4.03%); these returns are both statistically and economically significant. In contrast, for extremely bad management forecast news quintile, there is a negative 3-month (12-month) abnormal returns of -0.95% (-3.26%). The middle quintiles are characterized by statistically (and economically) insignificant abnormal returns, arguably due to the lower variation in forecast surprise among these portfolios. The hedge portfolio 3-month (12-month) abnormal returns from buying (selling) the shares of firms in the extreme positive (negative) forecast news quintile equals 4.60% (7.29%) and are statistically and economically significant. Further, since more than half of the hedge portfolio abnormal returns appear to be generated in the first three months, our subsequent analysis will largely focus on the drift in returns in the three months after the management forecast.
To further illustrate the patterns of returns in relation to the management forecasts, Figure 1 plots the cumulative abnormal returns at monthly intervals of up to twelve months after the forecasts for the top, middle, and bottom quintiles of forecast surprises. Each number on the x-axis represents the end of a month, with month '0' being the third day after the management forecast. Figure 1A In untabulated analyses, following Bernard and Thomas (1990) and Sloan (1996) , we examine whether there is a concentration of hedge portfolio returns around the earnings announcements that occur after the management forecasts. Evidence of such concentration of returns is consistent with our arguments in Section 2 that investors delay their reaction until more credible information (e.g., announcement of actual earnings) appear to support the forecast. We find that there is indeed a concentration of hedge portfolio returns around the very next earnings announcement and around the announcement of the earnings being forecasted. The three-day hedge portfolio return around the next earnings announcement and around the earnings announcement being forecasted is 0.91% and 0.88%, respectively. Assuming that there are 252 trading days in a year and assuming no concentration of returns, one might have expected, in any threeday window, for the hedge portfolio returns to be about 0.087% (3 / 252 x 7.29%).
Overall the results in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 are consistent with a market underreaction to management forecast news. We document a drift in abnormal returns in the direction of the forecast news for up to twelve months, although most of the returns appear to be generated during the first three months subsequent to the forecast. These findings are consistent with the literature on PEAD, which documents positive (negative) drift in returns subsequent to positive (negative) earnings news.
4.2
The role of forecast credibility in the market reaction to forecast news
In this section we examine the short-term and long-term reactions to forecast news as a function of forecast credibility. We begin by examining the role of forecast credibility in moderating the short-term market reaction around the management forecast.
The two regression specifications that we rely on in the analyses are:
where AbRet3d is the three-day abnormal return around the management forecast;
QSurprise is a quintile transformation of management forecast surprise (Surprise);
Credibility is one of our proxies for credibility: Our first hypothesis states that the short-term market reaction is expected to be stronger for more credible forecasts. Hence, we expect β 3 to be positive in Eq. (3), and γ 1 to be greater than γ 2 in Eq. (4).
Before we present the regression results, Table 2 Table 3 presents the regression results. The dependent variable is the three-day abnormal return (AbRet3d). In the first column, the positive coefficient on QSurprise indicates that investors respond more positively to more positive management forecast news. Specifically, the coefficient on QSurprise implies that the difference in the shortterm market response to top and bottom quintile of forecast surprise is 13.92%, consistent with the finding in Table 1 .
The next few columns provide some evidence that investors' response is stronger for more credible forecasts. In particular, the coefficients on the interaction term between
QSurprise and QAccuracy in Column I, QSurprise and QR&D in Column IV, and
QSurprise and AnalystAgree in Column V are positive and statistically significant. This implies that investors respond more strongly to forecasts associated with greater prior forecast accuracy, forecasts associated with higher proprietary costs as proxied by R&D intensity, as well as forecasts for which analysts agree with the management forecast. For example, the difference in the short-term market response to top and bottom quintile of forecast surprise is greater by 3.05% for firms with more accurate forecasts.
In Column VII, we also find some evidence of that the magnitude of the market reaction to negative forecast news is greater than that to positive forecast news, suggesting the negative forecast news is more credible than positive forecast news; this finding is consistent with prior evidence (e.g., Hutton et al. 2003) . We find no evidence, however, that litigation risk (Column II) and competition (Column III) influences the reaction to forecast news.
Overall, the results in Table 3 indicate that the short-term market reaction to forecast news is generally stronger when the news is regarded to be of greater credibility.
However, the findings are consistent for most, but not all, credibility proxies. Thus Table   3 provides only some support for our first hypothesis, which states that investors rely on the credibility of the forecasts when responding to forecast news.
Our second hypothesis predicts that the market under-reaction to forecasts will be smaller for forecasts with higher credibility. To test this hypothesis we adapt Equations (3) and (4) to examine the long-term returns subsequent to (as opposed to short-term returns around) the management forecast. We also include controls for known risk factors and variables associated with market drift in returns. We rely on the following the two regression specifications:
where AbRet3m is the three-month abnormal return beginning from the second day after the management forecast; QSurprise, Credibility, Good News and Bad News are defined above; and Control is a set of control variables that includes three risk factors -firm beta (Beta), logarithm of size (Log Size), and book-to-market (BEME) -and three variables associated with drift in returns -momentum (QMomentum), earnings surprise (QPEAD), and analyst forecast revisions (QAnalystDrift). The inclusion of the last three control variables is to ensure that the post-management forecast returns that we document is not simply a continuation of the drift in returns due to prior events such as market returns, earnings announcements or analyst forecast revisions.
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In untabulated analysis we find that QSurprise has a Pearson correlation of 0.20 (0.23, 0.16) with QPEAD (QMomentum, QAnalystDrift). As before, to mitigate cross-sectional and time-series dependence, we cluster the standard errors by firm and calendar quarter (Petersen 2009 ).
Our control variables are measured as follows: Beta is estimated from a market model time-series regression of a firm's returns on market returns for firms with at least 18 months of returns in the five years before the month of the forecast. Size is the market value of equity at the beginning of the month of the management forecast. BEME is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal year. Momentum is the 12-month cumulative raw return ending two months before the month of the management forecast, PEAD is the difference between the actual earnings announced on or just before the management forecast date and the most recent analysts' mean consensus EPS forecast, scaled by price two days before the earnings announcement date. AnalystDrift is the difference in the consensus analyst mean EPS forecast one month and two months before the management forecast, scaled by price two days before the computation of the consensus forecast one month ago. For consistency with QSurprise, we also use quintile rank specifications for momentum, PEAD, and AnalystDrift; we label these variables QMomentum, QPEAD and QAnalystDrift, respectively. 13 We are not actually testing the existence of an underreaction to prior returns, to earnings surprises or to analyst forecast revisions when QMomentum, QPEAD, and QAnalystDrift are included in the regressions. First, our sample is substantially different from those used in these literatures due to the requirement that a firm issues a management forecast. Second, the cumulation of the returns begins from the second day after the management forecast date.
Hypothesis 2 states that we expect the underreaction to management forecast news to be smaller for more credible forecasts. Thus, we expect β 3 to be negative in Eq.
(5), and γ 1 to be smaller than γ 2 in Eq. (6). Table 4 presents the results with AbRet3m as the dependent variable. In the first column, the coefficient on QSurprise can be interpreted as the estimate of the hedge portfolio abnormal returns from an investment strategy of buying (selling) firms in the top (bottom) quintile of forecast surprises. This coefficient indicates a hedge portfolio 3-month abnormal return of 3.13%. This result is consistent with our earlier results in Table   1 , that there is an underreaction to management forecasts.
In the subsequent columns, the coefficient of the interaction term on QSurprise x
Credibility can be interpreted as the difference in the returns of QSurprise hedge portfolios between firms with high and low credibility. The coefficient on QSurprise x QAccuracy in Column I is a significant -3.01; this indicates that, compared to least credible forecasts in terms of prior forecast accuracy, the 3-month abnormal returns are 3.01% lower for most credible forecasts. In other words, the coefficient on QSurprise indicates that the abnormal returns are 4.60% for the least credible forecasts whereas the sum of the coefficients on QSurprise and QSurprise x Credibility indicates that the abnormal returns are 1.59% (=4.60%-3.01%) for the most credible forecasts.
The remaining columns repeat the analyses with other measures of credibility.
The results in Columns II (III, IV) indicate that, compared to firms with the least credible forecasts in terms of litigation risk (competition, R&D), those with the most credible forecasts have 3-month hedge portfolio abnormal returns that are smaller by a statistically significant 10.17% (4.98%, 3.96%). In Column V, while the coefficient on QSurprise and AnalystAgree of -1.28 is in the expected direction, it is statistically insignificant. Finally, in the last column, we compare the difference in the underreaction between bad and good news forecasts. We find that there is a significant underreaction to good news but the underreaction to bad news forecasts is statistically insignificant.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Post-management-forecast drift versus post-earnings-announcement drift
Our results so far suggest a market underreaction to management forecasts that is a function of the credibility of the forecast. We now provide two sets of tests to increase the confidence that our results are indeed driven by the forecast and its credibility, as opposed to some other factor associated with the post-earnings announcement drift. We note, however, that all regressions in Table 4 already control for the prior stock price momentum, earnings surprise and forecast revision. Nonetheless, we perform dual sorts to explicitly control for earnings surprises. In addition, we check whether the effect of credibility is robust to controlling for other determinants of PEAD.
In our first set of analysis, we create dual-sort portfolios on the basis of the earnings surprise and the management forecast surprise. The objective is to evaluate the hedge portfolio based on the management forecast holding the earnings surprise constant.
To do so, we sort firms in fifteen portfolios based PEAD terciles and Surprise quintiles.
14 We form these portfolios by independently sorting our observations into PEAD terciles and Surprise quintiles.
14 The choice of three-by-five (instead of five-by-five) portfolios is to ensure a reasonable number of firms in each portfolio. This is particularly important in the earlier years of our sample for which the number of forecasts is relatively small. For example the average number of firms in each portfolio in 1996 and 1997 is about 20-30 firms. Most importantly, the future abnormal returns are also in the direction of the forecast surprise, regardless of the direction of PEAD. For instance, the hedge portfolio 3-month (12-month) abnormal returns from buying (selling) the shares of firms in the extreme positive (negative) forecast surprise quintile equals 3.92% (6.17%) among firms in the bottom tercile of PEAD. This pattern is also observed for the other PEAD terciles.
For example, the hedge portfolio 3-month (12-month) abnormal returns from buying (selling) the shares of firms in the extreme positive (negative) forecast surprise quintile equals 3.67% (8.24%) among firms in the middle tercile of PEAD and 6.33% (6.49%) among firms in the top tercile of PEAD.
Our second analysis replicates the analysis in Table 4 , and transaction costs (Bhushan 1994; Ng et al. 2008) . Bernard and Thomas (1990) show that there is persistence, i.e., first-order serial autocorrelation, in seasonally differenced earnings and that this persistence is one explanation for the PEAD. To measure persistence in earnings surprises (Persistence), we obtain, for each management forecast of a firm, the prior 12 quarters (with a minimum requirement of 8 quarters) of seasonally differenced quarterly actual earnings from
Compustat and compute the first-order serial correlation in the these earnings. We proxy for size using the market value of equity at the beginning of the month of the management forecast (Size), institutional ownership using the percentage of shares held by institutional investors at the calendar quarter end before the management forecast (InstOwner), and transaction cost using the closing bid-ask spread on the month before the management forecast (Spread). Data to compute Size and Spread is obtained from the CRSP database, while that to compute InstOwner is obtained from the Institutional (13f) Holdings dataset in the Thomson Reuters database. Similar to our treatment of credibility proxies that were originally continuous variables, we transform these variables into quintile ranks (re-scaled to range from zero to one) and label them QPersistence, QSize, QInstOwner, and QSpread.
A recent paper by Gong et al. (2011) document that there is positive serial correlation in management forecast errors. This evidence indicates that management forecasts themselves reflect managerial underreaction to prior information. An implication is that even management forecasts that the market views as 100% credible could be associated with a drift to the extent the market's reaction to these forecasts simply reflects the underreaction implicit in management forecasts themselves. To control for this underreaction, we construct two variables: management forecast error of all forecasts prior to the current management forecast (Prior_MFE) and management forecast error of the current management forecast (Curr_MFE); management forecast error is management forecast minus actual earnings, scaled by stock price two days before the management forecast. As before, we transform these variables into quintile ranks (re-scaled to range from zero to one) and label them QPrior_MFE and QCurr_MFE. Table 6 presents the results after controlling for various determinants of the drift.
We introduce each of the determinants separately due to concerns about changes in sample sizes based on data requirements, multicollinearity between the variables, and the fact that our objective is not to run a horse-race between these variables. In the majority of cases, the coefficients on QSurprise x Credibility remain negative and significant, the only exception being the coefficient on QSurprise x AnalystAgree which is positive but statistically insignificant. Thus, our earlier inference that there is a larger postmanagement-forecast drift for less credible forecasts appears to be robust controlling for these determinants. In addition, based on the additional interaction terms, there is evidence that the post-management-forecast drift is lower for firms that are larger, have a greater institutional ownership, and whose stocks have higher transaction costs.
Interestingly, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term between QSurprise x QCurr_MFE is negative. Since higher values of QCurr_MFE indicate less understatement by managers, this means that the market correction to the underreaction to management forecast surprises is less when there is less understatement of actual earnings by managers.
Overall, the evidence in Tables 5 and 6 indicates that the post-managementforecast drift is a distinct phenomenon for which credibility is a mitigating factor. Table 5 shows that the management forecast drift continues to exist after controlling for the post-earnings announcement drift. Table 6 demonstrates that the role of credibility is also robust to controlling for other possible determinants of drift.
Decomposition of sample into quarterly and annual forecasts
The sample that we use in our earlier analyses consists of both quarterly and annual earnings per share forecasts. In this section, we examine whether our earlier results are robust across subsamples of quarterly and annual forecasts. Table 7 panel A reports the results of the regressions that replicate the analysis in Table 4 with subsamples of quarterly forecasts, whereas Table 7 panel B reports the results for the subsample of annual forecasts. The results in Table 7 are similar to those in Table 4 . In particular, the results in the leftmost column (titled "Main Effect") of Panel A (B) indicate that there is an underreaction to quarterly (annual) forecasts. In Panel A (B), the coefficient on
QSurprise indicates 3-month hedge portfolio abnormal returns of 3.58% (2.69%).
The remaining columns of both panels in Table 7 report the results of the regressions that examine the role of credibility on the underreaction to forecast news. As discussed earlier, to examine the role of credibility on the underreaction, we focus on the coefficient on the interaction term between QSurprise and QCredibility. The evidence that greater credibility reduces the underreaction appears somewhat stronger using quarterly (Panel A) than annual (Panel B) forecasts. In Panel A, we find that the coefficients on the interaction term between QSurprise and QCredibility are significantly negative for all proxies of credibility except AnalystAgree. We also find that the economic magnitude of the underreaction to good news to be greater than that to bad news. In Panel B, however, we only find statistically significant evidence for litigation risk and competition. For the remaining variables the estimated coefficients are in the correct direction but are statistically insignificant. Taken together, we conclude that the results in Table 7 provide some additional evidence that greater credibility reduces the underreaction to forecast news and the evidence appear to be stronger for quarterly forecasts.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether the market responds fully to the news in reported earnings and the explanation for this finding has been the subject of extensive research.
We hypothesize that the market underreaction to news is a function of the news credibility. We test this hypothesis by using management forecast as a proxy for news because prior literature has emphasized that the voluntary and non-audited nature of forecasts creates credibility concerns. To the extent that credibility concerns lead to an underweighting of news, and investors are more concerned about the credibility of voluntary disclosures than that of mandatory disclosures, management forecasts provide a powerful setting to test whether credibility has a role in explaining the underreaction to news.
We examine the abnormal returns around and subsequent to management forecasts to address two questions: i) whether the short-term reaction to forecast news increase with credibility and ii) whether credibility, by allowing a stronger short-term response, is associated with a lower long-term drift in returns. Using a variety of credibility measures, we provide evidence that the short-term reaction is stronger and the long-term underreaction is smaller when forecasts are deemed more credible. Further, we perform a battery of tests to mitigate the concerns that our findings are capturing market reaction to other forms of news (particularly earnings announcements) or are solely due to other determinants of market underreaction such as earnings persistence, investor sophistication or transaction costs.
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the role that credibility plays in the market reaction to news. By showing that investors discount forecasts with lower credibility, but that these forecasts have implications for future returns, our findings suggest that investors inappropriately weight credibility when reacting to management forecasts. Our findings raise the possibility that investors, by attempting to discount forecasts perceived as less credible, could be exacerbating the market underreaction these forecasts. Williams, P. (1996) . The relation between a prior earnings forecast by management and analyst response to a current management forecast. The Accounting Review 71, 103-113.
Appendix 1 -Measuring litigation risk
We use the litigation risk model in Rogers and Stocken (2005) Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the analyses. Panel B presents pairwise correlations for the credibility proxies, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the main diagonal. Accuracy is the prior forecasting accuracy based on the average of the accuracies of all management forecasts made before the current management forecast. LitRisk is the litigation risk exposure, Competition is the negative of the Herfindahl Index of the industry that the firm belongs, and R&D is the research and development expenses. AnalystAgree is an indicator variable equalling one (i) if the management forecast is a point forecast and the post-management-forecast analyst consensus mean forecast is within one penny of the management EPS forecast, or (ii) if the management forecast is a range forecast and the post-management-forecast analyst consensus mean EPS forecast is on or within upper and lower bounds of the management forecast, and zero otherwise. Bad News (Good News) is an indicator variable equal to one if the management forecast surprise is negative (positive). p-values are presented in italics below the correlations. This table presents regressions that investigate the effect of credibility on the short-term reaction to management EPS forecast surprises. The dependent variable is AbRet3d, which is the size-adjusted buy-hold return, in percentage, in the three-day window around the management forecast. QSurprise is the quintile rank of Surprise, where Surprise is management forecast minus pre-management-forecast consensus analyst mean forecast, scaled by stock price two days before the management forecast; the quintile rank is scaled to range from zero to one. Credibility is measured using various individual proxies: QAccuracy, QLitRisk, QCompetition, QR&D, AnalystAgree, and Good vs. Bad News. Accuracy is the prior forecasting accuracy based on the average of the accuracies of all management forecasts made before the current management forecast. LitRisk is the litigation risk exposure, Competition is the negative of the Herfindahl Index of the industry that the firm belongs, and R&D is the research and development expenses. QAccuracy, QLitRisk, QCompetition, and QR&D are quintile ranks of Accuracy, LitRisk, Competition and R&D, respectively. AnalystAgree is an indicator variable equalling one (i) if the management forecast is a point forecast and the post-management-forecast analyst consensus mean forecast is within one penny of the management EPS forecast, or (ii) if the management forecast is a range forecast and the post-management-forecast analyst consensus mean EPS forecast is on or within upper and lower bounds of the management forecast, and zero otherwise. Bad News (Good News) is an indicator variable equal to one if the management forecast surprise is negative (positive). Year-quarter fixed effects and the intercept are included in the regressions but, for parsimony, these coefficients are untabulated. t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are obtained after the two-way clustering of the standard errors by firm and by calendar quarter. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. This table presents regressions that investigate the effect of credibility on the post-management-forecast drift. The dependent variable is AbRet3m, which is the size-adjusted buy-hold return, in percentage, beginning from the second day after the management forecast. QSurprise is the quintile rank of Surprise, where Surprise is management forecast minus pre-management-forecast consensus analyst mean forecast, scaled by stock price two days before the management forecast; the quintile rank is scaled to range from zero to one. Credibility is measured using various individual proxies: QAccuracy, QLitRisk, QCompetition, QR&D, AnalystAgree, and Good vs. Bad News. Accuracy is the prior forecasting accuracy based on the average of the accuracies of all management forecasts made before the current management forecast. LitRisk is the litigation risk exposure, Competition is the negative of the Herfindahl Index of the industry that the firm belongs, and R&D is the research and development expenses. QAccuracy, QLitRisk, QCompetition, and QR&D are quintile ranks of Accuracy, LitRisk, Competition and R&D, respectively. AnalystAgree is an indicator variable equalling one (i) if the management forecast is a point forecast and the postmanagement-forecast analyst consensus mean forecast is within one penny of the management EPS forecast, or (ii) if the management forecast is a range forecast and the post-management-forecast analyst consensus mean EPS forecast is on or within upper and lower bounds of the management forecast, and zero otherwise. Bad News (Good News) is an indicator variable equal to one if the management forecast surprise is negative (positive). QPEAD is the quintile rank of the most recent quarterly earnings surprise, measured as the difference between the actual earnings announced on or just before the management forecast date and the preactual-earnings consensus analyst mean EPS forecast. QAnalystDrift is the quintile rank of the most recent analyst forecast revision, measured as the difference in the consensus analyst mean EPS forecast two months and one month before the management forecast. Beta is systematic risk, estimated as the coefficient on the market factor from a market model regression. Log Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in billions. BEME is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. QMomentum is the quintile rank of the 12-month cumulative raw return ending at the end of the second month before the month of the management forecast. Year-quarter fixed effects and the intercept are included in the regressions but, for parsimony, these coefficients are untabulated. t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are obtained after the two-way clustering of the standard errors by firm and by calendar quarter. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. This table examines the long-term abnormal returns in three-by-five portfolios. The portfolios are formed by independently sorting the observations into PEAD terciles and Surprise quintiles. PEAD is the most recent quarterly earnings surprise, measured as the difference between the actual earnings announced on or just before the management forecast date and the pre-actual-earnings consensus analyst mean EPS forecast. Surprise is the difference between management forecast and the pre-management-forecast consensus analyst median forecast. AbRet3m (AbRet12m) is the 3-month (12-month) size-adjusted buy-hold return, in percentage, in the three (twelve) months from the third day after the management forecast date. t-statistics are computed for the dependent variables (AbRet3m and AbRet12m) using the Fama-MacBeth procedure. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. This table presents, for subsamples of quarterly and annual management forecasts, regressions that investigate the effect of credibility on the post-managementforecast drift. Panel A (B) presents the results for quarterly (annual) forecasts. The dependent variable is AbRet3m, the percentage 3-month size-adjusted buyhold return in the three months from the second day after the management forecast date. All the other variables are defined in Table 4 . All control variables in Table 4 (including the intercept and year-quarter fixed effects) are included in the regressions; for parsimony, the coefficients on these variables, as well as the intercept, are not tabulated. t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are obtained after the two-way clustering of the standard errors by firm and by calendar quarter. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
FIGURE 1 Post-Management-Forecast Drift
This figure presents the post-management-forecast cumulative abnormal returns for the management forecast news. Figure 1A presents the results for all forecasts whereas Figure 1B (1C) presents the results for quarterly (annual) forecasts. The cumulation of the buy-hold returns begins from the third day after the management forecast and continues for up to 12 months. The forecast news of each firm in each year is sorted into quintile portfolios based on the prior year's distribution of all forecast news, Surprise. Surprise is the difference between management forecast and the pre-management-forecast consensus analyst median forecast. Q1 (Q5) refers to the quintile with the lowest (highest) forecast news. Q2-Q4 refers to the middle three quintiles of forecast news. Figure 2A (2B) presents, for each calendar quarter, the equal-weighted 3-month (12-month) abnormal returns of buying firms in the top quintile and selling firms in the bottom quintile of forecast surprises, with the trades being made on the third day after the management forecasts. AbRet3m (AbRet12m) is the 3-month (12-month) size-adjusted buy-hold return, in percentage, in the three (twelve) months from the third day after the management forecast date. 
